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19 MAY 1956

Mr. William Benton
Publisher and Chairman
Encyclopaedia Britannica
342 Madison Avenue
Suite 702
New York 17, N. Y.

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter of May 2 attaching your speech at the Institute for Study of the USSR. I have read it with great interest, and found it a lively summary with which I am in general agreement.

In the discussion of whether there are grounds for hope in the improved and broadened education of the Soviets, I find the difference between us narrowing. As I told you in one of my recent letters, many of the recent visitors to the USSR, particularly those who speak the language and were able to mingle in University and similar circles, have repeated doubt, disbelief and even political jokes such as we would not have anticipated three years ago. Moreover, in making my suggestion, I had in mind also the very point you make, that Soviet youth once having attained a higher education will resent being assigned to non white-collar jobs. In fact, I think they already resent being assigned at all. Within the last week, I note that the laws on labor discipline have been relaxed. Now the Soviets continue to deal with this problem will be something to watch very closely.

I call your attention, also, to the Pravda editorial of early April which referred to the excessive length to which the new freedom of criticism was being carried -- obviously meaning that the government itself was being criticized -- and cited specifically a group in a scientific institute.

Another aspect which will bear close watching is the extent to which the personal competition for position, which you will described, is affected by nepotism and by book qualifications, degrees, etc. The USSR seems to be reaching very rapidly the point where connections count heavily and also the point where effective careers are closed to those who have not reached a certain educational level. This has advantages from their standpoint, but it can surely be carried too far, generating both discontent among the unchosen and corruption in the educational selection process itself.

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In short, apart from the deeply false basis of the system in terms of human values, I think it not unlikely that its material efficiency will be affected over time. If this be optimism, please don't ever designate it as anything but cautious, and definitely long term.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

STAT
Drafted: 16 May 1956)

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WILLIAM BENTON
PUBLISHER & CHAIRMAN

May 2, 1956

Handwritten signature/initials

Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Allen:

Your generous letter of April 9th emboldens me to send along to you my speech of last Saturday morning in which I opened the current conference of the Institute for Study of the USSR.

As you will see, I quote you in this, as I have in many of my current speeches.

I testified on Tuesday to the Atomic Energy Committee and I will surprise myself if I haven't quoted you again!

Very sincerely yours,

Bill Benton
William Benton

WB:bf
enclosure

Opening Address by
Hon. Wm. Benton, Publisher
Encyclopaedia
Britannica
Institute for Study of the USSR
Carnegie Endowment Building
New York, N.Y.
April 28, 1956

THE USSR: SOME ELEMENTS OF STRENGTH
AND SOME OF WEAKNESS

I am honored by being here today. I do not myself have expert knowledge about the Soviet Union such as that possessed by the members of this Institute. My credentials are merely that from time to time I have occupied positions in which I have participated in United States policy-making on problems raised by the Soviet threat.

In preparation for a visit to the USSR last fall, I read books I should have read before. I talked to men I should have known before. I visited London to learn from the Foreign Office far more than I could extract from our State Department. If the State Department thinks the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia is of any significance, it is not willing to let me in on the secret. I learned about this and much more in London last year.

Since my return last November I have kept trying. I have learned much, for example, from a critique by Mr. Harry Schwartz, famed Russian expert of the New York Times.

However, we Americans agree with the Soviet leaders on Clemenceau's dictum: that war is much too important to be left to the generals, and this is my best credential. In our American society the USSR is far too important even for you experts. The most important desideratum in the U.S. today is knowledge and understanding of Russia. The problems posed by the Soviet Union involve

every area of our American society. Policy to meet these problems is decided by our elected officials and their advisors. Presidents Eisenhower and Truman and Roosevelt have had to make the great policy decisions. In making them they are influenced not only by what their advisors tell them, but by their own preconceptions and by the common stock of ideas about the Soviet Union which they share with the great majority of our people.

Many of our past mistakes can be traced to the deficiencies of the common stereotypes which have so powerful a hold on our collective minds. Even you professional scholars have made no secret of the deficiencies in your own knowledge. The notion that Russia is a riddle, a mystery, an enigma is so pervasive that even the most expert evaluation of the Soviet Union is believed by the policy makers to contain large elements of guesswork. One of my friends who qualifies as a Russian expert goes so far as to say that the situation in Russia today is more obscure than at any time since the 1917 Revolution. I don't believe this. Such differences in interpretation encourage policy makers to substitute their own intuition or preconceptions for the evaluation offered by specialists or for unpalatable advice. Thus wishful thinking has often been substituted for rational analysis. Recently it has even been substituted for the facts by an official so high ranking that he shall be nameless. This topsy-turvy substitution occurred before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The official gave us a new version of victory, an upside down version which made him sound more like a Madison Avenue public relations man than a statesman. He flatly denies the Soviet leaders are leading from strength and suggests that their hand is a Yarborough.

To help the policy makers minimize risks and to reduce our percentage of error is the urgent role of this group, and I congratulate you and your leadership. There are few men with whom I have worked intimately whom I respect as I do Mr. Howland Sargeant. The job of many of you is to work with him in helping people of the free world season their intuition with the facts.

This morning I shall begin your conference of 1956 by outlining briefly a few areas in which it seems to me that we Americans are today guilty of over-estimation and of underestimation of the Soviet Union. As a generalization, I suggest that the balance of our past errors is heavily weighted: we have grievously underestimated the USSR and its capabilities. Do you remember, for example, the assertions from high quarters which we receive in June and July of 1941 that the Soviet Union would collapse quickly before Hitler's onslaught? No less revered a figure than General George Marshall participated in these prophecies.

Today, however, the pendulum may be swinging too far in the other direction, towards overestimation. The assumption is even being made in some quarters that the "new Soviet man" is indeed ten feet high, and incorruptible and unselfish as well, and that the Soviet government can perform any feat it decrees.

I shall first describe three areas of errors of underestimation.

Most obvious of the three are our bad guesses about Soviet science and technology. Here the evidence seems crystal clear. We American people were astonished by the appearance of the Soviet atom bomb; we were startled by the Soviet hydrogen bomb; and recently we

have been amazed by high class Soviet jet fighters and bombers and passenger planes. Even responsible U.S. government officials had not expected such Soviet triumphs until years later. For years, Senator Symington has been warning us of Soviet progress in guided and ballistic missiles. This week from London we've had the ballistic and intercontinental warnings of Khrushchev himself, and I shall tell you this: on my recent trip I decided that although the Russian leaders don't always mean what they say, they often do, and most often on military technology.

Successful Soviet security measures have played a role in nurturing our habit of underestimating Soviet science and technology. The habit, however, has deeper roots than this. Until very recently, we Americans have tended to think of Soviet citizens as ignorant peasants, illiterate, and incapable of handling machinery or grappling with advanced scientific ideas. We forgot the great Russian technological talent which gave de Seversky and Sikorsky to the U.S. We ignored the enormous Soviet effort to train technicians and scientists, to funnel the best brains of the USSR into the making of the most deadly military equipment. Moreover we fed our disdain for Soviet science with such aberrations as the Lysenko fantasy. We comforted ourselves with the belief that political interference with Soviet science doomed it to sterility. We failed to remind ourselves that, in the field of military production, results were valued by the Soviet leaders above ideology. We ignored the fact that scientists who gave merely formal verbal obeisance to Marxism-Leninism and yet produced results were likely to be wearing the order of Lenin. Our failure to ponder past Russian history also played its role. Why

should not a country which in the 19th century gave the world such geniuses as Mendeleev and Lobachevski produce great innovators in the 20th century? Why should it not breed even more of them, under its current educational program and its deliberate and intensive search for scientific talent?

A second example of underestimation is the area of Soviet economic progress. Only eleven years ago, the Soviet Union lay nearly prostrate, much of its industry and many of its most productive cities ravaged. Who in our government dreamed that the damage could be repaired so quickly, and with annual industrial production soaring to record highs? The USSR has indeed achieved its economic progress through the abysses of revolution, tyranny, disaster and war. The Four Horsemen have seemed to be the allies of Soviet industrial progress. The 39 year story is one of progress through catastrophe. It is the story of not one Chicago fire but many. Mrs. O'Leary's cow burned down a city which hoped to rival St. Louis. The new Chicago which rose from the ashes soared to commercial dominance over our whole mid-American empire.

The Soviet industrial victories remind me of a luncheon I attended in August of 1943 in Manchester, England. This was at the peak of the nightly obliteration bombings of German industry. Said a worried British manufacturer, "Just think of those efficient and modern new factories the Germans will build in Hamburg after Field Marshal Harris ("Butcher" Harris to the Germans) has pulverized them into cinders and ashes." He was prophetic, as we now know. After the war the Germans didn't have to worry about amortization allowances, and neither do the Russians today. The Soviet leaders predict

68,000,000 tons of steel by 1960. These are 10% heavier metric tons. From the standpoint of national security, on their past record of success we must accept the likelihood that their prediction will be realized. Moreover, when we compare Russian steel production with ours, let us not console ourselves overmuch because ours is larger. Would we not be wiser to recall how much of our own steel goes into gadgets and refrigerators and Cadillacs? Soviet steel goes into armaments and heavy industry; it isn't diverted to the more joyous and pleasurable outlets.

We Americans have put too much emphasis on the low Soviet standard of living, on the chronic Soviet housing crisis and the high prices for consumer goods. When we read that Secretary Mitchell says that the U.S. worker produces "2-1/2 times more than his Soviet counterpart," we pat ourselves on the back and conclude there is little reason to worry. Yet at the same time and in the same paper a British expert tells us that a Soviet steel worker produces as much per man as a British steel worker, though he is paid only half as much.

One reason why Americans have underestimated Russia's capacity for industrial progress is our failure to appreciate the capacity of a totalitarian regime to drive its people mercilessly towards its objectives. We have not grasped the peculiar Soviet admixture of pressure, incentive and propaganda. Especially, have not understood the talent for propaganda of the Soviet leaders, and the power of propaganda to incite the people. From our own experience in a democratic society we have found it hard to understand the terrible disproportions which are a key to the Soviet economy. That a country can invest in gigantic new steel mills and new machinery plants while its people are

ill-fed, ill-clothed and ill-housed has seemed incredible to many of us. Except in war, we of the U.S. would not stand for such continuous sacrifices to the government's dictates. We Americans have failed to understand what could be accomplished by a government which could extract daily sacrifices and keep on extracting them.

I have said that in the first place we have underestimated Soviet science and technology. Secondly, I have stressed our underestimation of the USSR's economic progress. Now for my third area of underestimation: this is our failure to pay tribute to the technical efficiency of Soviet leadership. This failure is partly because we are blinded by the economic and political ideas of the leaders, which to us seem naive, irrational and indeed cock-eyed. Until recently the figure of Stalin dominated our thoughts about leadership within the Soviet Union. We knew that he had destroyed thousands in the blood purges of the 1930's, and that leaders who survived had lived in deadly fear. But we failed to recognize the high order of ability that had surged to the top.

The most vivid impression of my trip of last fall to the USSR is of the calibre of the Soviet leaders I met. The 40 or 50 with whom I visited from 90 minutes to three hours seemed to me not only competent but vital, relaxed, confident of themselves and of their objectives. If these men were Americans, they would be among our big corporation presidents, our leading financiers, our top politicians and, I believe, they might well serve democracy as ably as they now serve communism.

Soviet society has been and is highly competitive for the individual. In one of my several exposures to Washington, the one

which I shared with Howland Sargeant in the State Department, I publicly remarked that the personal competition in Washington made what goes on within or between Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward, or General Motors and Ford, look like a game of dominoes - in contrast to the effort to crack the four minute mile.

This type of personal competition within the USSR, greatly intensified over anything we know in the U.S., to a point which literally involves life and death, has been the mother's milk of the present crop of Soviet officials. The old ruling class and the old bureaucracy were wiped out in 1917. Opportunities thus opened up everywhere. In the middle 1930's, the purges vacated thousands of top posts. Hundreds of thousands of subsidiary roles were regurgitated. Over and above these revolutionary annihilations of those in power, the steady and continuous expansion of the Soviet economy has developed a constant new supply of opportunities. To fill these, an expanding school system - for the old and aging as well as the young - has trained ever greater numbers.

Not only have there been ample opportunities for the able, but there have been incentives. The able Soviet citizen is richly rewarded, relative to Soviet standards, even though such rewards make a mockery of socialism's original egalitarian ideas. The Soviet scientists, bureaucrats, writers and others in the creative arts are the new plutocracy. However, the system of promotion is based upon a cruel demand for performance. The manager who overfulfills The Plan is well paid and promoted. The manager who underfulfills faces the threat of prison or even of execution for sabotage. A hard system this is, but most surely it is bitterly competitive for the individual.

It pays off for and by results. Why should we then be surprised that it has brought able leaders to many top positions? This is not the first revolution so to do.

The great inequalities this process has brought in its train have evoked discontent among those who do not scale the ladder's top rungs. We see the results of this discontent in the latest move to cut the high incomes of some groups among the Soviet privileged classes. Only this week Welles Hangen, a remarkably able young reporter of the New York Times, reports from Moscow a reduction in salaries for "Soviet professional and administrative" classes of as much as 50%.

Because I met seven of the members of the Praesidium last fall, I asked about the family backgrounds of all 13. Their backgrounds may illustrate the high mobility of Soviet society generated by the 1917 Revolution. Surely they demonstrate the competition which has generated the opportunity for men of ability to forge to the top. Do some of you recall the refrain of one of the poems of our great American poet, Carl Sandburg, "the strong men keep coming on?"

In Russia today, the leaders whom I met seem to me to be the strong, the tough, the dominant. They represented the survival of the fit, even though almost certainly not of the fittest. They terrify me by their quiet confidence as they do by their profound ignorance of western civilization. The most dangerous opponent is one who is strong - and rich - and ignorant.

But let us look at the backgrounds of some of these top men.

Bulganin - son of a white collar worker.

Kaganovich - son of poor working class parents; went to work at 14.

Khrushchev - son of a coal miner.

Malenkov - petty bourgeois background, father may have been petty official.

Mikoyan - son of a worker.

Molotov - son of fairly prosperous bourgeois parents.

Pervukhin - son of a blacksmith. (When I met Pervukhin

and asked him about his background, he said,

"My father was a blacksmith but he made me well."

Saburov - son of a miner, went to work at 13.

Voroshilov - son of a railroad watchman.

Zhukov - son of a poor peasant.

Does this brief casual listing of the family background of some of Russia's top leaders show how easy it is for some Westerners to underestimate them? Does this help explain why I cite as a third area of error of underestimation our failure to appreciate the talent of the leadership that has surged to the top in this competitive society? I could develop a fourth area or a fifth, but I think the three I have cited illustrate how we of the west, in our judgment of the policy and potential of the USSR, have too often been influenced by obsolete ideas and by wishful thinking and by our intense dislike for totalitarianism.

We have not even been willing to admit the heavy world-wide impact of the Soviet international propaganda. For more than two decades we have grossly underestimated its skills and effectiveness. I startled some of my colleagues in the U.S. Senate when I argued on the Senate floor that China fell to Red propaganda rather than to Red arms. I shall never forget a statement I heard General Marshall make early in 1947 shortly after he returned from China. He said, "China might have been saved by the massive use of radio and motion pictures, on a scale hitherto undreamed of." At that time, this statement was unrealistic of course - as he very well knew. The battle of ideas in China had by then been lost. There were at that time in China no radio receivers or movie projectors. The United States exported armaments instead of radios or movies. The Communists, years before, had sent into China thousands of Moscow-trained agitators and propagandists, village by village, using the propaganda themes they knew would be effective.

Now let me turn to some of our American errors in overestimating Soviet strength and capabilities. These I think are far less

serious. Civilizations (like businesses) destroy themselves by underestimating their competition rather than by overestimating it.

Yet this second area of error, that of overestimating Soviet potential and power, can still betray us in today's world. It can betray us in our domestic budget as well as in our expenditures overseas. It can upset America's budget and economic stability. Further, the voices urging it upon us grow stronger daily. Soviet offers of capital equipment abroad have led to exaggerated expectations that the Soviet Union may be about to conquer so-called "uncommitted billions" by delivering massive amounts of economic aid. A British economist has suggested that as early as 1963 the Soviet Union may attain the 1955 level of American industrial production. Senator Malone who preceded me to Moscow cried that we should discontinue the Voice of America because the Russian people have embraced their regime and do indeed support it wholeheartedly.

Some feel that the Soviet peoples are so devoted to their regime and their way of life that all western or satellite hopes of disunity are senseless.

In such views can lie a road to disaster for American policy. Such views can lead us down a road which can betray us.

To be more specific, there is, first, the overestimation of the link between the present Soviet regime and its people. Put another way, this is the underestimation of the discontent existing in the Soviet Union. If anything is plain in the dispatches from Russia, it is the widespread discontent. How deep and politically significant this is we cannot tell, but we know at least this, that the Soviet leaders have responded to it and that it is far from assuaged.

The Soviet people have borne the sacrifices of more than a quarter century of frenzied industrialization and war. But they have not enjoyed the sacrifices any more than would we. Today their standard of living is still painfully low. They observe their government continuing to pour vast resources into heavy industry. They watch it offering hundreds of millions of dollars abroad. They see that for two years in a row there have been no significant price reductions and no elimination of queues and shortages.

May I pause to tell you a Russian joke? Do you know why you see only the young in the Soviet queues to get a permit to buy automobiles? Do you know why at the same time you see only the old driving the automobiles? Do you really know? Think a minute. Think 2 or 3, if this may help, but I'm sure that only a Russian would grasp the horns of the dilemma of the joke.

The answer. Only the young have the strength to stand in the queues. Then they sell the ration tickets to the old. Only the old have the rubles for the purchase of the car.

The point: derision of the black market and the bureaucratic processes on which it thrives.

Can we suppose that all this background of sacrifice, and even of joking, is without effect? Can we not assume that the link between the regime and the people isn't iron-tight? What of the Malenkov period, when promises were held out for an improved standard of living, and this to be attained quickly? Do not such promises help show the pressure which the running sore of discontent exerts on the Soviet leaders?

Shall we American policy makers not also consider the current ferment as the Russian people reel under the impact of the revelations about Stalin? Only this week Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin are reported to be growing still tougher. Stalin is alleged to have been more anti-semitic than Hitler, with all Jews having been scheduled for deportation to Siberia. Can and should we now assume that the Soviet people are so stupid that they will not draw conclusions from the evidence given them by their own leaders, now laid each week before them, of how a madman deceived them, of how he lied to them and of how he even killed their brothers and sisters, their fathers and mothers?

The caution with which the revelations about Stalin are being fed out to the Soviet people seems to show the rulers' fear of popular reaction.

Can it be that because of the tremendous successes of the Communist propaganda since 1917 and even before - can it be that the Soviet leaders have now at last overestimated the power of their propaganda? When they now tell the youth of Russia about Stalin, when they tell the youth of Russia that Stalin was not infallible - may they not be sowing the seeds of unbelief in the Soviet propaganda? I'm not too hopeful here, because I am too impressed and too terrified by the successes of the Communist propaganda. But I have some hope. I like a phrase of Allen Dulles'. He writes me of his "cautious optimism" and from such seeds as the present cynical reversal on Stalin, from these may we not hope that future disbelief and discord may develop?

As an example, as a possible ground for cautious hope, may we not take the recent riots in Georgia, the clashes in Tiflis which

resulted in deaths now reported by the Associated Press to number perhaps up to 100. Do not these indicate that Georgian nationalism is not dead? Can we not assume that Ukrainian nationalism, Estonian nationalism, Uzbek nationalism are not dead? Khrushchev himself told the world in his opening speech at the last Party Congress that there is friction between the 16 Soviet Union Republics over appropriations and allocations. He hinted at jealousy and even at conflict among them.

Now let me turn to a second present danger of overestimation of Soviet progress. This is exactly the reverse of a point I made earlier when I argued that we tend to underestimate Soviet economic progress. Now let me argue that we are overestimating the strength of the USSR applied to the immediate future. Its recent industrial progress has been so impressive and so disquieting that we can easily be overwhelmed by the shadow of the future. But must we assume that the ambitious goals of 1960, as announced, will be carried out and in the time planned?

Skepticism would seem to be justified. To achieve the announced goals of the 68,000,000 metric tons of steel and 600,000,000 tons of coal -- these and other goals of the Sixth 5-year-plan - millions of workers will have to be sent to now uninhabited regions of Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia. Great new cities will have to be built. Huge investment funds are required. Soviet leaders have never before projected such a vast program. Never have they seemed to be so imbued with gigantomania, with huge projects seemingly almost for the sake of huge projects. May they not have miscalculated? We should not assume that they have, but most surely we should

not assume they have not. Here is the area in which scholars like you at this annual conference must give guidance to men like me who sometimes make the big decisions. Do you remember Al Smith? He was the man who in 1928 I supported for President of the United States. He said, "The expert must be on tap but not on top."

All of us know that the Soviet leaders, like our own leaders, have miscalculated in the past. To get the Kuibyshev hydro-electric power station to begin work in the last days of 1955 they had to transfer resources from elsewhere. As a result, the Stalingrad hydro-electric station is now scheduled to provide power in 1958, not 1956. We once heard much of the Chief Turkmen Canal designed to turn a vast desert into a garden; we heard of vast forest shelter belts to end the menace of drought. Where are these projects now? They were Stalin's "visions." They have vanished into thin air; the effort expended on them wasted.

Many among us here today ask how long will the Soviet people allow themselves to be exploited mercilessly. Recently Khrushchev has been forced to promise shorter hours of work, higher wages, and higher pensions. But as yet little has come of such promises. And surely it is no accident that the Soviet press is now hiding from its readers the concrete steps being taken in Poland to improve the conditions of the workers.

And what of Soviet agriculture? Shall we overestimate its progress while we underestimate its difficulties? Suppose the rains do not come in Kazakhstan again as they failed to come last year? What if there is drought in the Ukraine after last year's fabulous harvest? Again, how strong may the peasants' reaction be against

Khrushchev's plans for cutting down their private gardens and depriving them even of their family cow? I ask these questions merely to suggest the serious gambles being taken by the so-called collective leadership. But the Presidium is of course a group of trained and professional gamblers. No man or group of men can take over the home town, the country, the state, the nation or the world except by gambling. I'm willing to agree that the odds are on their side when they bet on their collective farms and agricultural productivity, about which they have much more knowledge than have I. I must also calculate, as a policy maker, that even the professional gamblers can back the wrong horse. The members of the Soviet Presidium are accustomed to gambling for colossal stakes, for life and death itself. But let us remember they are gambling, even while we pay tribute to their professional skill. Let us continue to recall our Mississippi heritage, that it doesn't take a royal flush to beat two of a kind.

And now what of the Soviet youth, what of the new surging millions who are about to get ten years of compulsory schooling and who then - most of them of course but by no means all - are then to be asked to become workers like their fathers and mothers? The Soviet cartoons show the 17-year-old girl graduate with her disdainful nose sky-high, while her parents humbly and beseechingly follow her, begging her to work. Khrushchev is deeply concerned about these white-collared and white-shod young, and we can hope he may be right. He made his concern clear in his last speech in Moscow before he left for Great Britain. He said, "Recently some part of the youth has begun to show incorrect views on labor in our Soviet society. This is reflected, for example in such facts: finishing ten years of

school, young boys and girls say, it's not fit that we, educated people, should go to the factory, to the building area, to the state or collective farm. Such educated people don't think that they live in a house built by building workers, that their fathers work in plants and factories, that they eat bread grown in state or collective farms by our Soviet people...It is hardly a secret that some parents think: 'They can't put my daughter who's finished high school to milking cows!'"

Now I will ask this group of scholars whether this new youth will be willing to put up with the needless hardship and exploitation suffered by the peasant masses of yesterday? I happen to think that the Soviet rulers are too smart to ask it to do so. With their new youth which has gone to school and studied physics as well as the 3 R's, with this new youth which is the alleged prototype of the phoney "new Soviet man," with this new youth the political leaders will use not only the stick but the carrot. Here I pause and bow towards Mr. Allen Dulles. In spite of the carrot and stick, Mr. Dulles finds grounds for hope in the rapidly accelerating standards for Russian education. He thinks a Russian with schooling and education is more likely to think independently and to think for himself. For myself, I wish I had found more evidence, in my quick look at the USSR, to support this thesis.

All of us here this morning, I am sure, share respect for Soviet economic accomplishments and concede that we shall see more in the future. What I now warn against, however, - as I ask you to examine the areas in which we may overestimate the USSR - is too mechanical a judgment, too automatic a projection of past trends into the

future. If a nation's productivity is tiny, it is not too much of a trick to double it in a Five-Year-Plan. But if its production is huge, then the doubling of it can be far more difficult. In their current 5-Year-Plan, the Soviet rulers are promising a 70% step-up by 1960.

An illustration of difficulties the Soviet leaders are now having in Asiatic Russia in the building up of great new enterprises is this comment from Trud of April 15, 1956, on the problems at the giant Sokolovsko-Sarbaisky iron ore combine in Kazakhstan which is scheduled to become one of the great Soviet iron ore sources:

"Last year the builders fulfilled their plan by only 61.5% and basically only an account of secondary, less difficult jobs. There were not built such important buildings as a garage, the depot, a warehouse for explosives. There was no electricity - in the trenches there work only two or three excavators, although more could be put to work."

I would conclude my comments on the possibility of over-estimating Soviet progress by once more saying that this is not the side of the coin which convinces me. We Americans are rich beyond the dreams of avarice or even of J. P. Morgan and the Chase National Bank. If we overestimate Soviet program, this may be so much the better for us. In the field of education, for example, this may only stimulate us to do some of the things we should do anyway, in pursuit of our own American dream.

But as an optimist and a democrat, I choose to think that it is reasonable to assume that the aspirations and desires of the Soviet

people for a better life, for decent housing, for more leisure, will not forever be frustrated. I am sure that these aspirations will remain vital. That they must be served is the great hope and goal which the free world shares with the people of the USSR. This hope must constantly be in the minds of the policy makers of the west as the necessity for serving it seems to be constantly in the minds of the policy makers of the USSR.

I have outlined some areas of overestimation of the USSR and some of underestimation. In these areas, your Institute, I would suggest in conclusion, has a growing and expanding role to play.

By the quality and objectivity of your research, you can help feed the stream of information which we of the free world need so desperately today, a stream which must be strong and vital if it is to present the Soviet reality to free men everywhere, here as in Asia, and I now refer first and foremost to the needs of the American people because American attitudes often shape the decisions of the so-called policy makers of the free world. Any morning in the United States the headline of the big story on the front page of the New York Times is likely to be triggered by the attitudes in Fargo, North Dakota and Boise, Idaho. This is why, on my return from the USSR, I emphasized that the Soviet government had one and only one big concession to make to us of the U.S. in the field of proposed "exchanges" about which I heard so much while I was in the Soviet Union. We are glad to admit to the U.S. the Soviet technicians and in most cases to show them all, but in return the Soviet leaders should admit, and freely admit, our journalists, our photographers, our motion picture men, and perhaps most importantly of all our scholars - so that these

Americans can in turn tell Fargo and Boise and all America what they have seen in the USSR. What should be our quid for the Soviet quo? I propose that we lay the following condition on our welcome to the Soviet technicians: they can come here provided our scholars and journalists are given in the Soviet Union freedom of movement and freedom of access to information. We will trade our know-how for a better understanding of the Soviet Union. For know-how we only want know-us, know the USSR. Then and thus our democratic judgment will be better. This role of informing the free world is also the role of your scholars here this morning, indirectly as you may think you work at it.

Among you men and women of the Institute are that infinitesimal portion of the Soviet-educated intelligentsia which now has the opportunity to assess the Soviet Union objectively and honestly, and without fear of violating the Party line or of punishment. In your work in the free world is the continuation of the great tradition of scholarship of the Soviet peoples, of Tugan-Baranowsky, or Klyuchevsky, of the statisticians who serve the zemstvos. You, the free scholars who have escaped the Soviet dictatorship, you have in your hands the obligation and the opportunity of the future. Your knowledge of the Soviet Union, where you spent most of your lives, is unique and invaluable to our common effort of understanding the true nature of Bolshevism. Your presence here today shows that you feel that you are still responsible to the enslaved peoples from whose midst you come. I am confident that by your scholarship and your work in the months and years ahead you will meet that obligation honorably and

courageously, and dedicated to the world of hope and freedom. By your presence here, you show that you are determined to seize that opportunity and to make your great contribution that is your potential, to our common goal within the United States and to the common goal of all peoples.

This is the goal of peace and freedom.

THE END